The Liberalisation of Foreign Ownership and
Cross-border M&A in South East Asia since the
1997 Financial Crisis by Dixon, Chris
www.ssoar.info
The Liberalisation of Foreign Ownership and Cross-
border M&A in South East Asia since the 1997
Financial Crisis
Dixon, Chris
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Dixon, C. (2006). The Liberalisation of Foreign Ownership and Cross-border M&A in South East Asia since the 1997
Financial Crisis. Südostasien aktuell : journal of current Southeast Asian affairs, 25(5), 5-41. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-337037
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Südostasien aktuell 5/2006 5
Studie
The Liberalisation of Foreign Ownership and
Cross-border M&A in South East Asia since the
1997 Financial Crisis
Chris Dixon
Abstract
Since 1997 there has been signiﬁcant liberalisation of foreign ownership regulations in most
of the South East Asian economies. This has been associated with some major increases in
the level of cross-border Mergers & Aquisitions (M&A). However, the 1997-2001 surge in
cross-border M&A activity has to be seen in the context not only of liberalisation, but also
of the short-term availability of distressed assets, the lowering of production costs and the
ﬁnal phases of a global FDI boom which had been increasingly driven by M&A. Similarly,
the sharp decline in South East Asian cross-border M&A since 2002 can be explained in
terms of the acquisition of the most easily purchased attractive assets and the sharp decline
in global M&A activity. However, it is argued that post-1997 liberalisation left in place
signiﬁcant barriers to increased foreign ownership and operation in all the South East Asian
economies. In addition to continuing direct restrictions on foreign ownership, a wide
range of other regulations inhibit cross-border M&A – notably those effecting bankruptcy,
M&A procedures and ﬁnancial reporting. Perhaps more signiﬁcant are the limitations on
foreign ownership and operation that result from ownership patterns, forms of corporate
governance, established business practices and the operation of the bureaucratic, judicial
and political systems. (Received April 5, 2006; accepted for publication June 28, 2006)
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Singpore
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Studie
Die Liberalisierung ausländischer Eigentums-
regelungen und grenzüberschreitender Fusio-
nen und Übernahmen in Südostasien seit 1997
Chris Dixon
Abstract
Seit der Finanzkrise 1997 hat es in den meisten Ökonomien Südostasiens eine beträchtli-
che Liberalisierung bei ausländischen Beteiligungen gegeben. Dies ging einher mit einem
signiﬁkanten Anstieg der grenzüberschreitenden Fusionen und Übernahmen. Die Welle
der Fusionen und Übernahmen muss im Zusammenhang mit der Liberalisierung gesehen
werden. Sie hängt auch mit der kurzfristigen Verfügbarkeit von gefallenem Anlagever-
mögen, der Verringerung von Produktionskosten und der letzten Phase des Booms bei
ausländischen Direktinvestitionen zusammen. Gleichzeitig kann der starke Rückgang von
grenzüberschreitenden Fusionen und Übernahmen durch den Kauf attraktiver Anteile und
den Rückgang globaler Tätigkeiten bei Fusionen und Übernahmen erklärt werden. Die
These lautet hier, dass auch nach der Finanzkrise 1997 einige wichtige Barrieren für auslän-
dische Beteiligungen und Produktion bestehen. Neben der Beschränkung ausländischen
Privateigentums gibt es eine Vielzahl von Verordnungen, die Fusionen und Übernahmen
hemmen, insbesondere Bestimmungen zur Insolvenz, zu Zusammenschlüssen und Über-
nahmen und zum Berichtwesen. Weitaus bedeutender sind jedoch Beschränkungen bei
ausländischen Beteiligungen, Formen der Unternehmensführung, in der Region übliche
Geschäftspraktiken und die Funktionsweise des Verwaltungs-, Rechts- und des politischen
Systems. (Eingereicht am 5. April 2006; angenommen zur Veröffentlichung am 28. Juni 2006)
Key words: Finanzkrise, Südostasien, Liberalisierung, ausländische Beteiligungen, M&A, Thai-
land, Singapur
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1 Introduction
Between 1997 and 2001 South East Asia experienced a remarkable surge in
cross-border M&A (Mergers and Acquisitions)1 as foreign investors purchased a
wide range of distressed assets left in the wake of the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis. Par-
ticularly in the most seriously affected countries, Indonesia and Thailand, such
purchases were facilitated by signiﬁcant liberalisation of the controls over foreign
ownership. For these countries, liberalisation was a direct result of the IMF
prescriptions attached to the rescue loans agreed during 1997. These involved sub-
stantial and immediate liberalisation of controls over foreign ownership, related
reform of corporate governance and privatisation of state owned enterprises.2
However, since 1997 almost every South East Asian country has relaxed some
controls over foreign ownership. In general, these were part of wider changes
aimed at increasing both competitive position and attraction for foreign invest-
ment, in the wake of 1997 crisis, a global slow-down in FDI ﬂows and increased
competition from, in particular, the PRC.
The surge in M&A that emerged in South East Asia during 1997 was slow
to attract the major attention of researchers (Meyer 2001). There was however
much initial comment on the expected scale of activity, impact and justiﬁcation
of liberalisation policies (Gilley 1998; Krugman 1998; Sender 1998). The IMF
prescriptions for Indonesia and Thailand, for example, were justiﬁed in terms of
increased foreign participation being necessary for ‘clean up’ and restructuring
that neither domestic business communities nor governments were capable of
undertaking (Dornbusch 1997: 26). Zhan and Ozawa (2001) concluded that
foreign purchases signiﬁcantly reduced the level of bankruptcy, thus softening
the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis and facilitating more rapid recovery. More
generally, foreign investment and ownership in sectors that had previously been
effectively domestic monopolies was expected to bring modern business practices,
improved corporate governance, increased efﬁciency, raised productivity, increased
competition, and accelerated recovery of the distressed Paciﬁc economies (Mody
and Shoko Negishi 2000: 7-9; Woo-Cumings 2001: 1). Thus, restrictions on
long-term capital movements needed to be abolished as completely and as rapidly
as possible (Yagi 2000: 132). Such views have been very extensively criticised,
1 M&A refer to the acquisition of 10 per cent or more of the equity of a company. It is also at this
level that M&A transactions become eligible for classiﬁcation as FDI.
2 See for example the summaries of conditions attached to the IMF loans in Dash (2003: 274-279).
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both in terms of their motivation and possibly adverse impact on the economies
concerned (see for example: Bello et al. 1998: 51-52; Bullard 2002: 149-151; Bullard
et al. 1998a; Bullard et al. 1998a: 525, 540; Wade and Veneroso 1998). These
disputes have to be seen in the context of much wider long-term debates over
the impact of foreign ownership on domestic ﬁrms, sectors and economies that
is beyond the scope of the present paper to review.3 However, as is examined
in the main body of this paper, these debates may be premature in a South
East Asia context, for they rest on assumptions concerning the nature, scale and
sustainability of the M&A activity and foreign operations, that are as yet far from
fully documented and perhaps seriously overestimated.
A number of studies have commented at an earlier stage on the scale of
the surge and the sector distribution of purchases (Brimble and Shernam 1999;
Mody and Shoko Negishi 2000; Zhan and Ozawa 2001). While Legewie and
Meyer-Ohle (2000a) have reviewed the extent to which the increased possibilities
of purchase have resulted in changes in the strategies of TNCs operating in South
East Asia. More recently, Freeman and Bartles (2004) have produced an over-view
of South East Asia investment inﬂows, highlighting the theoretical and policy
issues, and drawing attention to the increased importance of M&A. In addition,
some national and sectoral studies of the extent of cross-border activity and its
impact on ownership patterns have begun to appear, for example Bartles and
Freeman (2000), Freeman and Bartles (1999), Brown (2004, 2006), Dixon (2004).
However, in general, detailed information on the impact of the M&A surge and
the extension of foreign ownership in South East Asia remains fragmented and
partial.
Compared to FDI, data on cross-border M&A remain far from comprehensive
or reliable.4 Major problems of deﬁnition and recording continue to distort
national, regional and international data on volume of ﬂows (UNCTAD 2002:
303; Bartles 2004: 155-156; Reisen and Soto 2000: 74, 76). More problematic still
is the question of the number of deals and the extent to which these involved
controlling interests. Here, a number of major commercial databases are available,
however these (and even more their analysis) tend still to be focused on North
3 Amongst an extensive literature see, for example, the reviews by Ozler and Taymez (2003) and
Bhagwati (1998).
4 Except where otherwise stated this paper draws on the UNCTAD, data-base which remains by far
the most comprehensive and reliable.
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America and Europe rather than South East Asia.5 The data problems make for
some uncertainty over the exact changes in cross-border M&A that have occurred
in South East Asia since 1997, the contribution to investment inﬂows and the
extent to which foreign ownership has increased. The latter is by far the most
problematic and largely accounts for the still limited detailed published work.
This paper outlines the scale, sequence and international context of the
1997-2001 surge in South East Asian M&A (section 2). Attention is drawn to the
brief duration and abrupt curtailment of the M&A boom. In section 3 it is argued
that while there has been some very major liberalisation of foreign ownership,
some signiﬁcant barriers remain in place. Perhaps more importantly, relaxing
the foreign ownership regulations have exposed other signiﬁcant regulatory and
non-regulatory barriers (section 4). These can effectively limit the extension of
foreign ownership and hinder the operation of acquired companies. In section 5
the scale of post-1997 M&A and increases in foreign ownership are put into
perspective through a review of evidence from Thailand. In the conclusion, it
is argued that there is a need for much more detailed work on the extent and
impact of foreign ownership, but available evidence calls into question both the
sustainability of M&A activity in much of South East Asia and questions the sug-
gestion that the 1997-99 M&A had ‘a profound impact not only on the industrial
structure of the host economies but on international business across Asia’ (Meyer
2001).
2 Post-crisis M&A
Prior to the 1997 crisis while the South East Asian economies had been major
recipients of FDI (Table 1), they were limited areas of activity for cross-border
M&A (Table 2, 3). Thus, the South East Asian economies, like those of East Asia,
were generally out of step with the global trends in FDI, which since the early
1990s had been increasingly driven by cross-border M&A (see: Wan-Soon
2000: 161; UNCTAD 2000: xxii, 114-115). A repeat of the situation that prevailed
more brieﬂy during the late 1980s (Table 2, 3). In addition, until 1997 South
East Asia was not part of the general shift of M&A activity towards the Third
World (Tables 2, 3 and 4) with Latin America and the Caribbean being the
dominant areas of activity (Ferraz and Hamaguchi 2002: 388-390; UNCTAD
5 Notably, Thompson Financial – Acquisitions Monthly, KPMG – Deal Watch – PriceWaterHouse
Coopers – Asia-Paciﬁc Bulletin, Bureau Van Dijk - Zephry, and Mergent - Mergent.
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Table 3: Cross-border M&A by country of selling (US$m.)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Brunei - - - - - -
Cambodia - - - - - -
Indonesia 332 683 1164 819 3529 2790
Laos - - - - 269 266
Malaysia 351 1096 1166 441 1449 485
Myanmar 260 - - - - -
Philippines 4157 1905 1523 366 2063 544
Singapore 294 468 2958 1532 4871 556
Thailand 833 5209 4611 3069 1057 247
Vietnam 63 - 59 19 4 6
SE Asia 6290 9561 11481 6246 13242 4894
Third World 66999 82668 74030 70610 85813 44532
World 305048 533848 768644 1144316 593979 369789
SE Asia % 2.1 1.9 1.5 0.6 2.2 1.3
Third World% 22.0 15.5 9.7 6.2 14.4 12.8
Source: UNCTAD, 1998; 2000, 2003; 2004; 2005.
Notes: - zero or near zero; * inapplicable / not meaningful.
The data for Thailand is from the Bank of Thailand and the South East Asian and world totals have been
adjusted accordingly. See comments in section 4.
2000: xxii). The increased importance of Third World M&A, which has been
generally associated with liberalisation and privatisation under crisis conditions,
has been seen as one of the distinctive features of the most recent global wave of
acquisitions (Ferraz and Hamaguchi 2002: 383). In so far as South East Asia was
a ﬁeld of activity for cross-border M&A prior to 1997, a signiﬁcant proportion
was intra-regional, the main purchaser being Singapore and, to a much lesser
extent, Malaysia (ASEAN 2001; Bartles 2004: 156-159). This was a reﬂection of
Singapore’s comparatively mature ﬁnancial and manufacturing sectors, reinforced
by government policies of expanding regional activity and assisted by links with
Chinese business communities.
During the period 1991-96, the Philippines and Singapore were the largest
recipients of cross-border M&A (Table 2, 3), though only in the Philippines was
M&A of major signiﬁcance compared to FDI (Table 4). This reﬂected more liberal
foreign ownership regulations (discussed in section 3) reinforced in the Philippines
by signiﬁcant privatisation. Elsewhere in the region foreign ownership was heavily
Foreign ownership/cross-border M&A 13
Table 4: Cross-border M&A as a percentage of FDI
Annual Annual Annual Annual
average average average average
1987-90 1991-96 1997-2002 2002-4
Brunei - 0.2 - 0.2
Cambodia - - - 0.3
Indonesia 11.6 11.7 * *
Laos - 3.1 - *
Malaysia 16.3 6.1 24.4 11.7
Myanmar - 1.2 14.5 51.3
Philippines 12.7 42.2 128.2 58.5
Singapore 11.3 5.1 11.23 10.5
Thailand 1.5 9.4 52.0 40.3
Vietnam - 0.1 1.6 2.3
SE Asia 10.1 9.3 36.1 25.0
Third World 11.7 27.3 31.9 24.2
World 80.4 53.8 71.5 56.5
Source: calculated from Tables 1 and 2+3.
Note: - zero or near zero.
restricted. In addition, members of the South East Asian business communities
generally held strongly negative views of mergers and disposal of assets and
‘traditionally avoided’ such activity (Bartels 2004: 156). Where M&A did occur,
they were normally the result of negotiations between the key individuals, without
outside advisers, and reﬂected the manner in which personalities and relations had
driven Asian business (Markland 2001: 2). In general, before 1997, aggressive M&A
activity was extremely limited domestically and almost unheard of across-borders
(Il Chnong Nam et al. 2001: 99-100; Rossi and Volpin 2002: 27). Similarly,
as in emergent markets in general, where domestic and cross border M&A did
occur, it appears to have been almost exclusively motivated by extensions of
networks and markets, with few, if any, cases of transactions aimed at gaining
proﬁt through short-term asset arbitage (Ferraz and Hamaguchi 2002: 384). This
situation reﬂecting the generally low levels of capitalisation, incipient nature of
the capital markets, and related ownership forms (see comments in sections 4
and 5).
During the latter part of 1997 and the early months of 1998, the collapse of
large parts of the corporate sector, particularly in Indonesia and Thailand, led
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to expectations of widespread distressed assets available at ‘ﬁresale’ prices, with
foreign companies picking-up substantial assets at rock bottom prices (Gilley 1998;
Sender 1998; Krugman 1998). In the event, while there were attractive bargains,
these appear to have been nothing like as abundant or as cheap as many anticipated
(Frank 2000; 2002a; Chen and Findlay 2002: 27). While their attraction was tem-
pered by the economic and political disruption, particularly in Indonesia (Robison
2001: 123), continuing restrictions on foreign ownership, the reluctance of many
owners to sell, and other regulatory and non-regulatory barriers discussed in
sections 3 and 4. However, as the crisis spread and deepened, owners of distressed
assets became increasingly willing to sell, and foreign ownership regulations were
relaxed. As a result, cross-border M&A became increasingly common features of
South East Asian business and increasingly involved the acquisition of controlling
interests when and where this was possible. Though there were a large number of
negotiations that did not result in deals, this was particularly the case in Indonesia
(Prem-chandra Athukorala 2003). However, it should be stressed that this is a
common feature of M&A activity (Knowles-Cutler and Bradbury 2002), and it
may be that many would-be purchasers had quite unrealistic expectations of the
South East Asian situation (see comments in Frank 2000, 2002b; Financial Times
2002).
The surge of M&A activity begins in the Philippines in 1997, expanding into
Thailand from 1998, Singapore from 1999 and Indonesia from 2001 (Table 2, 3).
Overall, during 1997-2002 there was more than a six-fold increase in M&A activity
in South East Asia, and major increases in all the economies except Brunei and
Cambodia (Table 2, 3). For South East Asia as a whole, M&A expressed as a
share of FDI,6 increased from 9.3 per cent during 1991-96 to 36.1 per cent during
1997-2002, with signiﬁcant increases in all the economies except Singapore and
Vietnam (Table 2, 3). In the latter, there had been few pre-1997 possibilities for
M&A activity and no signiﬁcant changes subsequently. While in Singapore, the
post-1997 liberalisation made only marginal changes to an already, by regional
standards, comparatively liberal ownership and active M&A situation, and there
were few distressed assets available for purchase (Table 2, 3).
The expansion of M&A masked a sharp decline in the level of intra-regional
M&A, which had been a signiﬁcant part of the limited pre-1997 activity (ASEAN
2001; Bartels 2004: 159). Indeed, there were some signiﬁcant retreats, particularly
6 For the problems inherent in comparing FDI and M&A see UNCTAD (2002: 303).
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from Indonesia with such major Thai companies as Siam City Cement and
Charoen Pokphand disposing of assets.7 A major exception to this was Singapore,
which has since 1997 signiﬁcantly extended its role as the principle regional
purchaser of South East Asia assets (Bartles 2004: 159; UNCTAD 2005: 325).
However, for the other economies the decline in regional purchases was more
than offset by the growth of extra-regional activity.
The expansion of cross-border M&A was most spectacular for Thailand (Table
2, 3), where it moved in close accord with FDI.8 However, while M&A has made
major contributions to regional FDI, the close positive relationship between the
annual ﬂows of FDI and M&A found in Thailand does not hold for the other
economies or the region as whole.9 Other than for Singapore the ﬂows have a
slight tendency to move inversely. This is only markedly so for Malaysia. In
Indonesia the inverse relationship reﬂects high levels of M&A activity running
against, and greatly ameliorating, the large scale of dis-investment. Generally, it
could be argued that the inverse movement reﬂects M&A activity expanding when
the overall conﬁdence of greenﬁeld investors in the economies concerned was low
and distressed / low priced assets were perhaps more readily available. Certainly,
since 1997 M&A activity has tended to concentrate in the most distressed sectors
(Mody and Shoko Negishi 2000: 7-8). The unclear and complex relationship
between FDI and M&A in South East Asia contrasts markedly with the clear
positive ones observed at the global, North American, European and, to a lesser
extent, Latin American and Caribbean levels (see UNCTAD 2000: 115-117).
However, this has to be seen in terms of the early stage of the opening of South
East Asia as an arena for M&A activity, under conditions of crisis and rapid, but
extremely uneven, liberalisation with elements of resistance and uncertainty over
operating conditions (see sections 3, 4 and 5).
Despite the complex relationship between M&A and FDI, by 2000 the shear
volume of activity led UNCTAD (2000: xvii) to assert that M&A had become the
7 Charoen Pokphand, for example, disposed of its 60 per cent holding in its Indonesia afﬁliate, PT
Cyber Access Communications, for US$120m.
8 A simple correlation of regional M&A and FDI: R = + 0.7636; R2 = 0.5831.
9
R R2
Indonesia -0.4427 0.1959
Malaysia -0.6624 0.4388
Philippines -0.0298 0.0004
Singapore +0.2833 0.0803
South East Asia -0.1825 0.0333
16 Chris Dixon
major mode of entry of TNCs into the South East Asian economies. However,
the context and motivation for the purchase of South East Asian assets were
extremely varied and not always easy to classify. While some companies reacted to
the crisis by reducing activity, curtailing expansion plans and even withdrawing
investment, others saw distressed assets, declining costs, currency devaluation and
liberalisation measures as opportunities. This seems to have been particularly the
case with export-oriented sectors, retailing and rapidly growing innovative sectors
such as the production of advanced logic micro-chips and bio-technology (Molteni
2000: 112-114). Here, companies were prepared to increase production and make
purchases to extend their networks. In some cases such expansion had been long
targeted (Legewie and Meyer-Ohle 2000b: 239) – as with Tesco’s purchases of the
Thai-based Lotus supermarkets. A signiﬁcant amount of such activity took the
form of foreign partners acquiring long-sought majority or full ownership of local
joint-ventures, as and where this became possible (Acquisitions Monthly, January
1999: 44: UNCTAD 2000: 52). However, these purchases involved a major change
in company strategy away from minority holdings, establishing a presence and
building relationships with local companies (Legewie and Meyer-Ohle 2000b: 239).
Such a shift in approach implies that the companies concerned believed that the
liberalisation of foreign ownership regulation reﬂected a long-term commitment
of governments to increased foreign activity and the prospect of the emergence
of an operating environment conducive to the operation of foreign business
networks. As is discussed in sections 3, 4 and 5, in some cases such expectations
may have been premature. It may also be signiﬁcant that it were particularly
Western companies that changed their strategy, while Japanese concerns, with
generally much greater experience in the region, generally preferred to continue
building relationships and inject additional capital into existing afﬁliates (Legewie
2000: 84, 95).
While the majority of purchases of South East Asian assets can probably be
explained in terms of extension of transnational networks and market penetration
in the manner analysed by Giroud (2004), there were undoubtedly some highly
speculative purchases in the most distressed sectors (Mody and Shoko Negishi
2000: 7-8). Early in the post-crisis period a variety of equity funds were dedicated
to the purchase of Asian company assets (Acquisitions Monthly, January 1999:
44). The operation of such funds undoubtedly lay behind the very wide range
of purchases made by some, particularly European, organisations (Legewie and
Meyer-Ohle 2000b: 239). The Asia-Paciﬁc president of GE-Capital stated:
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Our strategy is very opportunistic.... We don’t have speciﬁc pools of capital
set aside for speciﬁc countries and speciﬁc reasons. Thailand went into crisis
ﬁrst. Thailand had the IMF in early. Thailand got its auction process together
early so we’ve participated more. (Financial Times 21 October 1998, cited
Hemmington 2000: 223)
Between the expansion of networks and the extremes of ‘bottom feeder’ activity
lies a signiﬁcant number of acquisitions that reﬂected the need to re-capitalise the
corporate structure, many wholly or partly based on debt for equity swaps (World
Bank 2001: 8; Kasian Tejapira 2002: 329-230). These appear to have become more
common as international creditors have sought ways out of the slow moving legal
and corporate procedures (see sections 3 and 4), particularly in Indonesia and, to a
lesser extent, Thailand. Some of these deals are thought to have been rather poor
returns by the standards of international debt workouts. A striking example is the
acceptance (after four years of negotiation) of 95 per cent of the equity in Bakrie
& Brothers as key to the restructuring of the US$1bn. debts of Indonesia based
Bakrie Group (Worzniak 2005: 53). It may be that many such deals, together with
speculative purchases, will be further restructured and wholly or partly sold-on,
perhaps back to domestic purchasers. In addition, given the continuing barriers
to foreign ownership and operation outlined in sections 3-5, a similar fate may be
in store for some of the acquisitions motivated by network extension and market
penetration.
A critical question is the extent to which M&A, regardless of motive has
become a permanent feature of South East Asian corporate activity. The 1997-2001
surge was spectacular by any standards, but declining sharply in 2002, with the
exception of Indonesia, the level of M&A activity returned to near pre-crisis
levels, though remaining signiﬁcantly more important relative to FDI (Table 4).
Subsequently, only for Singapore has activity returned to the high levels associated
with the 1997-2001 period (Table 2, 3). In addition, Indonesia appears to be on
a steeply declining trend since 2001 (US$2031m. in 2003 and US$1269 in 2004).
However, for the region as whole in 2002-4, M&A inﬂows and contribution to
FDI were some three times the pre-crisis levels. However, to some extent the
importance of M&A reﬂected continued low levels of regional non-M&A FDI. In
a global context, South East Asia’s share of FDI declined from 7.0 per cent during
1991-96 to 2.8 per cent during 1997-2004, while the region’s share of cross-border
M&A increased in these periods from 0.9 per cent to 1.4 per cent. These changes
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have, of course, to be seen in the context of global declines since 2000 in FDI,
M&A and the contribution of M&A to FDI (Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4). While some of
the decline in M&A can be related to a decline in privatisation (UNCTAD 2002),
there are indications that M&A, particularly in emergent markets, has become
less favoured by investors and shareholders (Ghemawat and Ghadar 2000; Frank
2002b; McCaughlin and Quinlin 2002).
While the 1997-2001 surge in cross-border M&A can be simply explained in
terms of the crisis and some rapid liberalisation, in these respects the situation
could be regarded as following the pattern of many parts of the Third World since
the early 1980s – with the major omission (to date) of large-scale privatisation.
However, as is indicated in the next section, the exact relationship between
liberalisation and cross-border M&A in South East Asia is by no means clear cut.
More signiﬁcantly, there are doubts over the extent to which liberalisation and
related reform have created a situation conducive to sustaining a high level of
cross-border M&A activity in much of South East Asia.
3 The liberalisation of foreign ownership and its limits
It is not the intention of this paper to review the often complex political processes
of liberalisation since 1997. These issues have been particularly well examined for
the key economies by, for example, Drysdale (2000) and Rodan et al. (2001). The
aim of this section is to outline the extent and speed of liberalisation, and indicate
the nature and importance of the remaining direct barriers to foreign ownership.
From the mid-1980s there was signiﬁcant liberalisation of South East Asian ﬁ-
nancial and trade regimes. This gave a considerable measure of access for domestic
companies to international funds and left few controls over short-term ﬁnancial
ﬂows in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. However,
signiﬁcant restrictions on long-term movements remained. These imposed major
limits on the ability of foreign companies to operate in certain sectors, acquire
permanent titles to land or controlling interest in domestically registered com-
panies. Such restrictions had by the mid-1990s become major issues for many
trading partners, a focus of attention in AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) and
AIA (ASEAN Investment Area) negotiations and, in a broader context, were be-
coming central to the WTO agenda. Within the region Singapore was a particular
advocate of liberalisation, as were some major corporations in Indonesia, Malaysia
and Thailand.
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Prior to the 1997 crisis, signiﬁcant liberalisation of foreign ownership had only
taken place in the Philippines and Singapore (Table 5). In the other economies
full or majority foreign ownership remained almost entirely limited to export
and other priority areas, operating under various promotional and incentive pro-
grammes, such as the BoI (Board of Investment) in Thailand or the Indonesian
BKPM (Capital Investment Co-ordinating Board). Outside these areas, where a
degree of foreign ownership was permitted, it was generally subjected to complex
approval procedures and limited to non-controlling levels. These varied consider-
ably between countries and sectors – by the mid-1990s limits ranging from 5 to
49 per cent of equity were variously enforced in the region. In addition, in many
cases, foreign ownership and operation were in practice made extremely difﬁcult
by the intricate web of laws and regulations, coupled with vague administrative
guidance, bureaucratic ﬁat, outright corruption and related delays, most strikingly
in Indonesia (see comments in section 4).
The comparatively liberal ownership situation in the Philippines dates from
the 1991 Foreign Investments Act. This while facilitating a high level of foreign
acquisitions during the early 1990s (Table 2, 3), also excluded foreign activity from
an exceptionally large number of areas under the Foreign Investment Negative
List (Table 5). However, in 1997 the situation was sufﬁciently open and the
level of accessible distressed assets such, that a major surge in cross-border M&A
occurred (Table 2, 3). Since 1997 there has been only limited further relaxation
of controls. While a signiﬁcant number of proposals have been advanced, these
have generally failed to be implemented due to opposition in the Congress, related
vested interests and signiﬁcant popular support (EIU 2003a: 10, 12-13). A major
exception was the liberalisation of the banking sector which from 2000 permitted
100 per cent foreign ownership (EIU 2004d).10 This was followed by a major
acquisition by DBS and the expansion of minority holdings, which explains part
of the 2001 blip in cross-border M&A (Table 2, 3).
Singapore’s liberal controls over foreign ownership were also tempered by
limits in many key areas (Table 5). With the 1997 crisis, the Singapore government
opted to further liberalise the ﬁnancial regime (Lim 2002: 29-30). Some new areas
were opened to foreign activity (but not full ownership)11 and limits removed on
10 With the proviso that not more than 30 per cent of the sector could be foreign owned. At the end
of 2001, 15 per cent was foreign owned (UNCTAD 2004: 321).
11 Most signiﬁcantly during 2002, telecommunications, law, medicine and superannuation funds
(Singapore Investment Climate Report, July 2992: 2)
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Table 5: Limits on foreign acquisition of ownership of domestic in 1997
Indonesia Up to 49% of listed companies; not permitted for unlisted companies; exclusion
from such areas as down-stream oil and gas, banking and insurance; requirement
that most foreign activity had to involve JVs or other forms of co-operation
Malaysia Generally limited to 30% of equity; stipulation that 30% of shares must be held
by bumiputra.;exclusion from areas deemed in the national interest, e.g.
banking, insurance and motor vehicles, and those involving ownership of land
Philippines 100% ownership permitted, but excluded from: mass media,
telecommunications, retailing, public utilities, resource exploitation - including
mining and inshore ﬁshing; limited to 30% in advertising, 40% where land
ownership is involved or the enterprise is small,* 60% in banking
Singapore Foreign ownership restricted in: media, legal and other professional services,
marketing, residential property ownership, banking (40%), insurance (20%); in
banking approval of the Monetary Authority or holdings of 5% or more; listed
companies deemed to be in the national interest limited e.g. 27.5% for
Singapore Airlines
Thailand Full foreign ownership effectively excluded from all areas under the 1972 Alien
Business Law; banking and ﬁnance limited to 25%; minority ownership
excluded from a wide range of areas, including agriculture and any involving
ownership of land
Source: Indonesia: Montes and Muhammad Ali Abdusalamov 1998: 167-168; Robison 1987; Pangestu 1989:
218-33; Freshﬁelds 2001. Malaysia: Freshﬁelds 2001: 32-36; Masahiro Kawai 2000: 305, 325; Prem-chandra
Athukorala 2000; UNCTAD 2000, Box V4: 147. Philippines: Bautista & Tecson 2003; Hutchinson 2001:
60-61; Freshﬁelds 2001: 50; 2004: 54. Singapore: Kanishka Jayasuriya and Rosser 2001: 248-249, 252;
Rodan 2001: 155, 157. Thailand: Bangkok Post 12 November 1997; Bangkok Post 23 February 1997;
Freshﬁelds 2001.
Note: * Deﬁned as less than US$200,000 capitalisation in 2003.
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the levels of foreign equity in others, notably banking (1999) and insurance (2002).
Though in the latter areas the acquisition of a controlling interest requires the
approval of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, which it has stated that it is not
prepared to give (Freshﬁelds 2001: 50; 2004: 54; EIU 2004a: 17). However, both
before and after the 1997 crisis Singapore had by far the most open position on
foreign ownership in South East Asia, the clearest and simplest M&A procedure
(EIU 2004a: 17-18; Freshﬁelds 2004: 59) and related high levels of M&A activity
(Tables 2, 3 and 4).
In the Philippines and Singapore the post-1997 liberalisation was a domestic
response to the crisis and furthered already comparatively liberal ownership regu-
lations. This contrasts markedly with Thailand and Indonesia where, particularly
in the former, liberalisation was externally imposed on a very restrictive situation.
Prior to the 1997 crisis foreign ownership in Thailand was governed by the
extremely restrictive 1972 Alien Business Law. This required that every registered
business in Thailand should have majority Thai ownership (Table 5). The only
signiﬁcant exception was the small number of US-based corporations permitted
100 per cent ownership and full operation under 1966 Thai-US Treaty of Amity
and Co-operation. However, following the Thai government reaching agreement
with the IMF in mid-August 1997, there was rapid liberalising of foreign owner-
ship. Starting with the opening to full ownership of the ﬁnancial sector and JVs
established under Board of Investment concessions (Freshﬁelds 2001). As in the
Philippines, there was considerable opposition to many of the measures which
resulted in delays and watering-down. However, the changes were sufﬁcient to
engender a major cross-border M&A boom from 1998 (Table 2, 3). Reforms were
consolidated in the 1999 Foreign Business Act which became effective in March
2000. This opened up the majority of the Thai economy to full foreign ownership,
but left in place some important exclusions, notably telecommunications and
activities involving land ownership.12
In Indonesia, the pre-1997 situation was only marginally less restrictive than
Thailand’s (Table 5; Heritage Foundation 2001). However, moves to liberalise
foreign ownership were announced before the government called in the IMF in
October 1997 (Haggard and MacIntyre 1998). In the event, following the ﬁnalising
12 Other areas of exclusion were: media, farming, ﬁshing, real estate, domestic transport, mining,
sugar reﬁning, rice milling, engineering, architecture services, most construction, tourist services,
low level wholesaling and retailing, insurance, accountancy, law, and some brokerage services (EIU
2003a; Freshﬁelds 2004).
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of the agreement with the IMF, it became clear that the Soharto regime was
either unwilling or unable to effectively implement the policies it had announced
(Robison 2001:120). While there was some progress following the fall of Soharto
in May 1998, there was no major and effective liberalisation until 2000 when
the majority of the economy was opened to foreign ownership (EIU 2003d;
Freshﬁelds 2004; Robison 2001: 120; Kanishka Jayasuriya and Rosser 2001: 245).
However, some important areas continued to be excluded, notably down-stream
oil and gas purchasers. More signiﬁcantly, in most cases of purchases involving
majority control, ofﬁcial approval remained necessary, and acquired operations
became foreign companies under the supervision of the BKPM (Freshﬁelds 2004).
In addition, the uncertain Indonesian political and economic environment has
scarcely been conducive to the expansion of cross-border acquisitions. It is perhaps
not coincidental that the expansion of M&A activity in Indonesia coincides with
a sharp decline in Thailand as the most attractive deals were concluded (Table 2,
3).
Before the 1997 crisis Malaysia was, after Singapore, the most heavily de-
pendant on FDI and allowed fully owned foreign companies to operate in the
export sector with some of the least restrictions in the region (Takatoshi Ito 2001:
66; Jomo 2001: 496). However, restrictions on foreign ownership were at least
as great as in Indonesia and Thailand (Table 5; EIU 2004c: 15). Following the
1997 crisis Malaysia’s move towards more nationalistic policies initially appeared
to precluded any liberalisation of the restriction on foreign ownership (see for
example Prem-chandra Athukorala 2000). However, some limited changes in
199813 were followed by some expansion of foreign acquisitions during 1998 and
1999 (Table 2, 3). More signiﬁcant liberalisation took place in 2000 as part of a
wider package aimed at stimulating FDI and in 2003 the majority of areas were
opened to foreign ownership, but approval remained dependent on a case by case
evaluation. While the changes generated increased M&A activity during 2004,
in practice, with the exception of Vietnam, Malaysia remains the most restricted
of the major South East Asian recipients of FDI. In addition to the stipulation
that 30 per cent of equity must be held by bumiputra, the approval process can
be lengthy and foreign purchasers must prove that the acquisition would not be
against the national interest and would provide net economic beneﬁt to Malaysia
(EIU 2003c: 29; Freshﬁelds 2001: 33; 2004; 36; UNCTAD 2000, Box V4: 147).
13 Telecommunication raised to 49%, real estate to 50%; full ownership of new manufacturing
permitted, except where it was deemed that Malaysia companies were ‘ﬁrmly established’.
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By 2003 all the South East Asian economies that were major recipients of
foreign investment, except Vietnam,14 had undergone signiﬁcant liberalisation of
regulations on foreign ownership. However, it is apparent that major restrictions
remain, not least with respect to ‘negative investment lists’, some of which remain
extensive and contain some remarkable ‘catch all’ terms,15 but also with respect
to areas where the approval of foreign activity is required – as in the Singapore
banking sector and signiﬁcant parts of the Indonesian and Malaysian economies.
In many cases, obtaining approval can be such a protracted process that would be
investors are effectively discouraged. More signiﬁcantly, as is discussed in the next
section, there are a wide range of barriers to foreign control and M&A activity
that extend well beyond ownership regulations, have been little affected by the
post-1997 liberalisation.
4 Non-ownership regulation barriers to the extension
of foreign ownership
Put at its most simple, no matter how liberal the foreign ownership regulations,
successful cross-border M&A remains dependant on the availability of attractive
assets, a regulatory framework that facilitates purchase and business attitudes and
practices that favour such activity. While, since 1997 a large number of purchases
have occurred, it is also apparent that there have been nothing like as many as
expected and many would-be purchasers have left empty handed (Frank 2000,
2002a). Large numbers of seemingly attractive and highly distressed assets proved
to be unavailable. Others, on close inspection, proved mired in unacceptable
ﬁnancial and operating conditions, and, as was noted in section 2, large numbers
of negotiations failed to result in deals.
A key factor in the unavailability of assets was that outside Singapore the
legal framework for bankruptcy remains weak, with procedures remaining slow
and cumbersome (Freshﬁelds 2004). In Indonesia there has been a series of
14 On 17 July 2003 the Vietnamese government raised the ceiling on foreign ownership of listed
companies from 20% to 30% (Freshﬁelds 2004: 1). However, given the very limited number of
companies that are listed, this has had little no signiﬁcant impact on M&A activity.
15 In Thailand foreign participation continues to be limited for some activities on the grounds of
national security, cultural consideration, environmental issues, Thai nationals not being considered
ready to compete with foreigners and other ‘special reasons’ (EIU 2003b: 16; Piyanuj Ratprasatporn
and Kobkit Thienpreecha 2002: 15-19).
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‘startling acquittals... as high-proﬁle business ﬁgures walked away from bankruptcy
proceedings and criminal charges’ (Robison 2001: 123). The lack of success in
court has left creditors with few options beyond protracted negotiation. This
has also been the case in Thailand despite the 1998 and 1999 bankruptcy reforms
which were extensive and were praised by the World Bank. However, in practice
the reforms have done little to accelerate the process of liquidation and increase the
effective power of creditors to force the issue (Kanishka Jayasuriya and Rosser 2001:
242). Procedures could still take years, and even where criminal prosecution is
involved the slowness of the system, the partiality of the judiciary and bureaucrats,
corruption and the close personal networks can make progress both protracted
and difﬁcult (World Bank 2002: 10-11, 40, 42-43). In addition, there has been
continuing government support for heavily indebted companies through direction
of bank lending and the charging of the Thailand Asset Management Company
with rehabilitating rather than liquidating the assets of companies (Dixon 2004:
58, 61). Under such conditions debtors are able to continually delay restructuring
negotiations. Perhaps the most extreme case was that of Thai steel tycoon Swat
Horrungruang who owed some US$787m. and in a much quoted statement
vowed that he would ‘neither ﬂee nor pay his creditors’. Subsequently, as Crispin
(2002: 43) has written, ‘the politically inﬂuential Sawasdi has served as the de facto
spokesman for Thailand’s notorious post-1997 corporate culture of non-payment’
and many followed his lead.
Resistance to restructuring and the sale of assets continues to be reinforced
by general opposition to increased foreign ownership by key sections of, in
particular, the Indonesian and Thai political, administrative and judicial systems.
In Indonesia there have been a series of court rulings against foreign companies,
notably against the local division of the UK-based Prudential Life Assurance in
2002, which have served to continue to unnerve foreign investors (EIU 2003d: 25).
Such moves have to be seen, at least in part, in the context of increased economic
nationalism in the wake of the 1997 crisis. Something that has been most overt in
the case of Malaysian government policy, but has been of considerable importance
in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, often with a considerable measure of
popular support (see for example Crispin 2001: 10; Dixon 2004: 60-64; EIU May
2001: 20, 27; Glassman 2001a: 517-524; Jarvis 2002: 298, 316; Kasian Tejapira 2002).
Indeed, there are on-going concerns that in Indonesia and Thailand nationalist
interests might make some aspects of foreign ownership more, rather less, difﬁcult
(EIU 2003b: 16; EIU 2003c: 25).
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Access to distressed assets by would-be purchasers is further limited by the
low levels of capitalisation16, high levels of family ownership and concentration of
shares in a small number of hands (Il Chong Nam et al. 2001; Kasian Tejapira 2002:
325; Khan 1999; 2002; The Economist 2000: 93; Yun-Hwan Kim 2000: 21, 28-29;
Unite and Sullivan 2000: 191-213). In 1997 the percentage of listed company equity
held by major family groups was: Indonesia 67.3; Malaysia 42.6; Philippines 46.4;
Singapore 44.8; and Thailand 51.9 (Claessons et al. 1998, cited by Il Chong Nam
et al. 2001: 95). In Indonesia, 16 large family controlled conglomerates, including
several banks, owned 70 per cent of the Jakarta Stock Exchange equity (Indonesia
Capital Markets, Annual Report 1997). The control over members of the group
was intensiﬁed by links with the banks. The Salim group which in 1995 controlled
17 per cent of the Jakarta Stock Exchange equity, centred on the Bank Central
Asia – Indonesia’s then largest private commercial bank. A very similar pattern of
bank-centred groups had also developed in Thailand (Jansen 1997: 55-65; Muscat
1994: 114-117; Pasuk and Baker 1995: 122). Such banks provide the majority of
funding for the linked companies, which in turn dominated the banks’ lending
activities. A study of Indonesian banks concluded that in 1995, 42 of them had
lent over 50 per cent of their loans to linked companies (McLeod and Garnaut
1998).
It may be that the ﬁgures cited above hide the true level of pre-crisis family
control because of the large numbers of major concerns that were not listed and the
very complex nature of the interlocking ownership patterns and family networks
(see comments on Thailand in Ammar Siamwalla 2001: 6-7; Akira Suehiro 1989:
224). While the strength of family control may well have been reduced in the
wake of the 1997 crisis, as in the Thai banking sector (Dixon 2004: 54), it might
be that in other areas such control has increased (Crispin 2000). Be that as it may,
the interlocking ownership patterns, like that of the Japanese keiretsu system,
make M&A activity particularly difﬁcult. Cruz (2001) concluded that in the
Philippines, where the ownership regulations are comparatively liberal and there
was signiﬁcant pre-1997 M&A, such activity remains seriously limited by family
ownership.17 In addition, the position of the family owned corporations has
generally been furthered by close links with politicians, bureaucrats, the military
16 At the end of 1999 the ﬁve South East Asian stock markets and a combined capitalisation of
US$465bn. – the equivalent of 3% of the all listed US listed stock and less than Microsoft alone
(Freeman and Bartels 2000: 2-3).
17 As has been noted the pre-1997 M&A activity in the Philippines was closely related to privatisation.
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and related organisations and institutions (amongst an extensive literature see for
example: Drysdale 2000; Rodan et al. 2001).
In addition to the family corporations, large parts of the economies of, in
particular, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are insulated from M&A by state
ownership. As well as large non-traded state sectors, there are signiﬁcant numbers
of major corporations in which the state retains a controlling interest. In 1997 the
Singapore state held 40.1 per cent of the share value of traded companies, while
the Malaysian state held 34.8 per cent (Claessons et al. 1998, cited by Il Chong
Nam et al. 2001: 95).
Where assets are available for purchase, a wide range of regulations and proce-
dures (or the lack of them) can inhibit M&A. In the Philippines, for example, the
comparatively liberal foreign ownership position, has continued to be seriously
compromised by complex rules and procedures, weak enforcement of regulations,
limited reform of corporate governance, and the overall difﬁculties involved in
rapidly concluding M&A arrangements (Masahiro Kawai 2000: 307; Abrenica
and Llando 2003: 276-277; EIU 2003a: 16). In Thailand the restrictions on direct
purchase of real estate, can sometimes prevent foreign investors from acquiring
majority control, anti-trust laws prevent buyers from acquiring a dominant mar-
ket position following take-over, and the legal requirements for mergers remain
complex and demanding (EIU 2003b: 17-18, 43-44; Freshﬁelds 2004: 88-93). For
example, the requirement for merging companies to consolidate their accounts
before the merger can be daunting and the reverse of Western practice. More
generally, regulations often prevent the forced buyout of minority sharehold-
ers while enabling them to block measures such as de-listing and rewriting of
the articles of association, even in the face of 75 per cent control (Freshﬁelds
2001; 2004). In addition, many companies have articles of association that place
limits on foreign ownership (Freshﬁelds 2001; 2004). It is not that these types
of barriers to take-overs and mergers are uncommon outside South East Asia,
but in combination with still often limited transparency, there are real dangers
of ‘poisoned pills’ hidden in apparently attractive deals. In this context, poor
accounting standards continue to fuel distrust among creditors and purchasers
(Deunden Nikomboriak and Somkiat Tangkitvanic 2001: 404). While the lack of
transparency extends beyond hidden agreements, undisclosed share ownership and
complex articles of association, to included uncertainty over levels of company
liabilities (see comments on Thai banks in section 5).
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The built in resistance of signiﬁcant parts of the South East Asian business
sector to increased foreign ownership has been maintained, perhaps even strength-
ened, in the face of liberalisation of ownership regulations. It is likely that
further signiﬁcant liberalisation may well occur, notably in Indonesia, Malaysia
and Vietnam, through the need to conform with WTO rules (see Hilary 2003),
commitments under AFTA, AIA and various bi-lateral agreements, and more
generally, as a response to falling levels of FDI (Table 1) and the increasing attrac-
tion of China. However, it may well be that no matter how limited the formal
regulations, the resistance facilitated by the non-regulatory barriers, particularly
when supported by government ofﬁcials, the judiciary and politicians, may be
extremely effective in limiting the growth of foreign ownership and the ability of
foreign controlled companies to operate and inﬂuence the business environment.
The reduction of these non-regulatory limits on foreign activity rests on signiﬁcant
economic and political change, particularly with respect to the political inﬂuence
of business, ownership patterns and business practices (see further comments in
sections 5 and 6). For some observers, the key to much of this is the increase in
foreign ownership which will engender changes in the direction of international
business practices and corporate governance (Dornbusch 1997: 26; Mody and
Shoko Negishi 2000: 7-9; Woo-Cumings 2001: 1; Yagi 2000: 132). Setting aside
the broader debates concerning the impact of increased foreign ownership (noted
in section 1), the key issue is the extent to which there has been signiﬁcant increase
of foreign control in South East Asia since 1997.
5 Post 1997 M&A in perspective: The example of
Thailand
It is important to put the 1997-2002 M&A activity into perspective. Firstly, it
should be stressed that outside Singapore and the Philippines foreign ownership
started from a very low level.18 The situation is perhaps best illuminated by
18 Little attention has focused on areas where the level of foreign ownership has declined in the wake
of the 1997 crisis. This is particular important for Indonesia, where foreign investment ﬂows were
negative 1997-2003 and the percentage share of foreign capital on the stock exchange fell from 50 in
1997, to 25 in 2000 (Indonesian Capital Markets).
28 Chris Dixon
Thailand, where the volume of M&A activity was by far the greatest in the region
(Table 2, 3).19
While there has been a high level of purchase of Thai company assets by foreign
investors there is a serious lack of hard evidence on the extension of majority
foreign control (Brimble 2002). Information on the number acquisitions that
involved majority control is far from consistent, but indicates that comparatively
few Thai companies have passed into majority foreign ownership since 1997. A
study by Brimble and Shernam (1999) suggested that between June 1997 and May
1999, there were 138 cases of foreign acquisition of interest in Thai companies,
of these 80 involved majority control. However, a later study by Moody and
Negishi (2000: 6-7) suggested that during the period 1997 to 1999 there were
only some 63 majority control acquisitions. For the whole period 1997-2002,
the UNCTAD data-base recorded 286 foreign acquisitions, but this source does
not record the number involving a controlling interest. For the sample period,
the Zephry database records 215 acquisitions of which 112 involved majority
control. These numbers must also be seen in the contest of the near-zero level of
foreign control before 1997. In addition, while there have been some high proﬁle
acquisitions in Thailand, such as Tesco’s take-over of the Lotus supermarket chain,
and the sale of 49 per cent of the Shin Corporation to the Singapore government’s
holding company, Temasek, none of the major national corporations have passed
into foreign control.20
Some increase in the level of foreign participation may be obtained from the
SET listings. However, this only gives a very partial view, because large numbers
of the companies involved in M&A activity were not listed21 and the possibility
that companies were de-listed following their acquisition. At the end of 1998, SET
data suggests that there had been signiﬁcant increases in foreign holdings in 23
19 While Thailand had the largest volume of M&A, the Philippines and Singapore received slightly
more relative to the size of their economies. A crude comparison of cumulative M&A 1997-2004 and
GDP (at current prices) for 2004 gives: Indonesia 0.6%, Malaysia 4.8%, Thailand 10.1%, Singapore
12.8%, Philippines 13.3%.
20 This contrasts markedly with South Korea, where a series of major nation corporations, such as
Samsung Electronics, Pohang Iron and Steel, and the major ﬁnancial groups Kookmin and Shinhan,
have become foreign controlled, as has 44 per cent of the equity of listed companies (Bowring 2004).
However, foreign control in South Korea is still regarded as fragmented and limited by the complex
ownership patterns and linkages between controlling groups (Bowring 2004).
21 According to Rossi and Volpin (2002: 27) during the 1990s as a whole only 17.1 per cent of Thai
M&A involved traded companies. This compares with Indonesia (10.6), Malaysia (15.2), Philippines
(21.4) and Singapore (34.5).
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of the 418 listed companies, 7 of which involved a controlling interest (Duenden
Nikomboriak and Somkiat Tangkitvanich 2002: 411). By the end of 2002, despite
the high level of M&A inﬂow (Table 2, 3), only 20 of the 381 listed ﬁrms had
majority foreign ownership, though 20.3 per cent of the paid up share capital was
foreign owned.22
While in general the increased foreign ownership in Thailand remains frag-
mented, partial exceptions to this are the electrical, electronics and banking sectors
where some concentration of foreign control has emerged. By 2002, in the electri-
cal sector, 3 out of the 7 listed companies and 69.5 per cent of the sector’s shares
were foreign controlled. Similarly, in the electronics sector, foreign interests con-
trolled 3 out of the 10 listed companies and 53.6 per cent of the shares. In each case
foreign control resulted from the buyouts of Thai partners. However, while these
were large companies, they represent only a small proportion of Thai electrical
and electronics production, sectors which remain dominated by foreign, JV and
Thai companies operating under Board of Investment promotional programmes.23
The most striking expansion of foreign ownership in Thailand was in banking,
which during 1997-2002 accounted for 37.5 per cent of total M&A and 22.8 per
cent of FDI. This resulted in four banks passing into foreign control and signiﬁcant
increases in foreign equity holding in three of the other eight banks.24 Overall,
there was a dramatic rise in the percentage of foreign owned bank equity from 9.5
in 1996 to 38.0 in 2002 (Dixon 2004: 54).25 The comparatively high level of foreign
equity control, reﬂects the much higher capitalisation of the foreign controlled
banks, some expansion of minority foreign holdings, but most signiﬁcantly, the
still very low level of capitalisation of the ‘Thai-Thai’ banks.
However, it is important not to exaggerate the extent of formal foreign control.
The four banks with majority foreign ownership only represented 10.2 per cent of
the branches, 5.6 per cent of deposits, 6.2 per cent of the market and 4.7 per cent of
assets (Dixon 2004: 54). UNCTAD (2004: 321), suggests a slightly higher level of
foreign asset ownership of 6.8 per cent, but stresses that is one of the lowest levels
of foreign ownership of a banking sector in the world. Signiﬁcantly, the foreign
22 Calculated from SET year end data for 2002 accessed on 4 July 2003.
23 In 2002 there were 100 Thai companies, 278 foreign companies and 234 JVs (Board of Investment
2002).
24 In 1996 there were 15 domestically controlled banks, by 2002 this had been reduced by closure,
merger and sales to 8.
25 This increased further in 2005 when Standard Charter increased its holdings in the Standard Charter
Nakornthon Bank from 75 per cent to 99.9 at a cost of US$498.5.
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purchases of the Thai banks appears to be the exception in the region, elsewhere
from 1997 ‘take-overs were either purchases of small ﬁnancial institutions of the
acquisition of minority stakes’ (Hishikawa 2003: 2). Even including the Thai
purchases the average size of ﬁnancial sector purchases were small (US$40m.)
compared to Latin America (US$187m.- Hishikawa 2003: 2).
Overall, the expansion of foreign control is far short of the predictions by
many observers at an early stage in the crisis (see for example, Asian Wall Street
Journal, 6 December 1997). The critical question is whether the level of foreign
control is sufﬁcient to have any major impact.
There is evidence to suggest that the foreign controlled banks have not found
operation easy and this has tended to discourage investors from further purchases
(Bangkok Post 27 September 2002, 3 October 2002, 30 November 2002; Dixon
2004: 54-55; EIU 2003d: 13; Oxford Analyica February 20, 2002). The foreign
banks have had to contend with much higher levels of NPLs (Non-Perform-
ing Loans) than expected, and a slow return to proﬁtability. In addition, the
Ministry of Finance terms the foreign controlled banks ‘hybrid banks’ and is
expected to subject them to much closer scrutiny. Perhaps more seriously, the
foreign controlled banks are likely to be largely excluded from the complex, often
long-established, and frequently highly personalised, linkages that exist within the
banking sector and between individual banks, the still family dominated corporate
sector and the Ministry of Finance.26 To this has to be added the still signiﬁcant
political inﬂuence of the Thai-Thai banks and the lack of ofﬁcial enthusiasm for
further foreign control in the sector (Davies 2004; Far Eastern Economic Review
November 4 1999: 10-13). Overall, the foreign controlled banks continued to be
out-performed by Thai-Thai banks, notably the Siam Commercial Bank, Kasikorn
Bank (formerly the Thai Farmers Bank) and the Bangkok Bank (see for example
Asian Money 2004, XV, 3: 33).
Despite the operating problems faced by the foreign banks, it is possible that
increased foreign involvement is having an inﬂuence out of proportion to the level
of formal control. It has been suggested that the banking reforms initiated by the
Bank of Thailand and the Ministry of Finance (see Bhanupong Nidhiprabha and
Warr 2002: 109; EIU 2003f), have been signiﬁcantly reinforced by the arrival of
foreign capital, technology and expertise, particularly with respect to spreading of
26 The importance of these linkages was brought out in the interview with Finance Minister Tarrin
Nimmanahaeminda (Far Eastern Economic Review 1999) when he commented on the number of
banking executives that were relatives, golf partners or frequent dinner guests.
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‘international standards’ of reporting, policy towards NPLs and, perhaps most
signiﬁcantly, the level of debt / equity ratios (for a general discussion of this
see Wade and Veneroso 1998: 3-23). Given the centrality of banks to the Thai
corporate sector, changes in banking practices could have a major impact on Thai
business.27 However, while there have been changes in banking practice it is far
from easy to identify the contribution of the foreign sector.
The new foreign activity in the banking sector is believed to have played
a signiﬁcant part in its rapid modernisation, including increased accessibility
of branches, the spreading of ATMs, online banking and the expansion and
diversiﬁcation of consumer credit (EIU 2002; 2003f; Kasian Tejapira 2002: 348,
Note 9; Tasker 1999). However, it is extremely difﬁcult to isolate the impact of
the extension of foreign control from other changes in the wake of the ﬁnancial
crisis. If there had been no foreign acquisitions in the Thai banking sector
modernisation may well have followed as the surviving companies sought to
develop new consumer business to replace that lost in the corporate sector. This
type of counterfactual lies at the heart of the debate over the impact of foreign
control (Meyer 2001).
If the Thai banking sector represents the greatest extension of foreign control
and concentration of M&A in the country that received the largest volume of
M&A activity, what does this suggest about post-1997 levels of foreign ownership
in South East Asia as a whole? Is it the case that despite some signiﬁcant post-1997
cross-border M&A, foreign ownership remains limited and fragmented? Perhaps
too much so too have any major impact.
6 Conclusion
During 1997-2001, combinations of crisis and liberalisation brought most of
South East Asia into, or further into, the world of cross-border M&A. The critical
question is how fully and lastingly has this happened? As has been discussed, there
remain very signiﬁcant barriers to the extension of foreign ownership. It may
well be that the post-2001 decline in M&A reﬂects these continuing obstacles as
much as global trends and the emergence of more attractive opportunities in East
27 Before the crisis averages ratios were between 2:1 and 3:1, by 2002 they had fallen to 1.5:1, as against
the Western norm of 1:1 (Kasian Tejapira 2002: 325). This may well reﬂect both banking and
corporate views of the investment climate rather than a major shift in policy (see Woo-Cumings
2001: 2, 5).
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Asia, particularly China (Bartels 2004: 159). While there may be an element of
consolidation in the slowdown in South East Asian cross-border M&A, it may be
that the 1997-2001 surge was just a ‘blip’ that will not lead to sustained activity.
A critical question is the motivation of foreign purchasers. As has been dis-
cussed, the majority of purchases appear to have resulted from international ﬁrms
wishing to expand their networks into South East Asian markets and production
systems. It seems clear that ﬁrms were taking opportunities to consolidate their
position in expectation of recovery of domestic markets and competitive position
in the most seriously affected economies. In addition, both new and long estab-
lished investors in South East Asia certainly appeared to base their activities since
1997 on the assumption that the crisis, related reforms and, in Indonesia, political
change, had set in motion processes that would rapidly open South East Asia to
large-scale foreign ownership, while transforming capital markets, regulations, cor-
porate governance and business practices towards Western norms. Slow progress
in these areas, lack of recovery, particularly in export sectors, may well have
discouraged further foreign purchases. The prospect for further M& A activity is
part of the broader challenge of re-establishing the region’s attractiveness for FDI,
give the continuing high levels of dependence on foreign funds28 and question
marks over levels of competitiveness, particularly with respect to the PRC (see
for example the discussion of Thailand in Glassman 2001b, World Bank 2004:
27-32). A situation reﬂected at the speciﬁc level by the relocation of electronics
production from Thailand to the Shanghai area and at the general level, in the
shift of investment away from South East Asia and towards the PRC which is
also beginning to emerge as a signiﬁcant target for cross-border M&A (Freshﬁelds
2005, 2004: 2-4; Mergers and Acquisitions July 2004: 4-12).
Given the conditions under which the M&A have taken place it seems likely
that signiﬁcant numbers will result in failure, restructuring and resale of part or
all of the assets. This seems particularly the case given the high level of failure
for M&A in general, even in the Western economies (see Bartels 2004: 156,
Knowles-Cutler and Bradbury 2002). It may be that signiﬁcant assets will be sold
on, particularly to domestic and regional buyers. The latter continuing to centre
on Singapore. It may be that given the nature of the South East Asian business
environments, networks and ownership patterns, such activity might be easier
and more likely to succeed than extra-regional purchasers.
28 Net FDI inﬂows expressed as a percentage of gross domestic capital formation for the period
1997-2002, averaged: Malaysia 14.0; Philippines 9.5; Singapore 39.7; Thailand 15.3; Vietnam 22.0.
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If South East Asia does not become a major ﬁeld of activity for M&A, par-
ticularly for extra-regional purchasers, what are the implications? It may be that
the South East Asian-Chinese business systems will be left largely in place. The
implications of this are both highly contested, far from fully researched and be-
yond the scope of the present paper to explore in more than a cursory manner.
For advocates of the South East Asian-Chinese model, such as Wo-Cummings
(2001: 5-6), established practice is market-adaptive and efﬁcient enough to need
little reform. In the absence of wholesale political and economic reform, changes
in the direction of Western corporate practice may well undermine the dynamism
of the business systems and the economies as whole. Against this, Regnier (2000:
17) concluded that the Thai-Chinese family business structure worked extremely
effectively until the changed conditions of the 1980s. Subsequently, it has become
increasingly a barrier to expansion, raising productivity and enhancing competi-
tiveness. In addition, Regnier’s (2000: 103-148) study of foreign involvement with
small and medium sized Thai enterprises revealed that those with close linkages
with foreign ﬁrms weathered the crisis much better than those without. Thus
in the absence of increased foreign ownership large numbers of small South East
Asian companies may loose the opportunity to become part of TNC networks
(Bartels 2004: 163 – citing The South China Morning Post, ‘Minnows easy pray for
patient giants’, 2001: 6). Thereby failing to internationalise business practices and
leading to South East Asia being left behind in the global system.
The ﬁnal issue is the possibility that slow-down in global FDI and increased
competition from the PRC force changes on the South East Asian economies as
will AIA, AFTA, WTO and various bi-lateral agreements which will undermine
South East Asian business systems, eroding the built-in resistance to foreign
ownership and operation. It may be too early to tell, but much detailed research
needs to be done.
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